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Abstract: The European integration process –which may be interpreted as a federalizing process– faces 
strong cultural and economic resistances. As a matter of fact, social rights have been understood and 
performed –within an old tradition of political thought– as proximity rights that cannot be universalized 
beyond the context of national States; this led to the resistant ideology of the protective function of State 
borders. Therefore it seems that the construction of the European Union as a complete political subject 
cannot be developed further if a centralized European Welfare is not created. 
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I. SOVEREIGNTY CRISIS AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUENT PROCESS 
 
The crisis of the Nation-State and, consequently, of State sovereignty, can be 
observed in the light of the most powerful and controversial of its factors in this part of 
the world: the European integration process. The latter follows the path from Treaty to 
Constitution. 
 
The analysis of the crisis of State sovereignty and of the European phenomenon 
from such a point of view is not a neutral choice, because it forces to take a stance on 
divisive issues: that a constituent process (which can be defined, according to a certain 
point of view, as federal, in one of the manifold possible realizations of federalism) is 
taking place; that therefore such a process is not completed yet, because it is not 
possible to affirm that Europe already has a Constitution in the proper sense (which 
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does not mean that it lacks a constitutional system, and which in any case encourages to 
draw up a concept of Constitution able to maintain consolidated categories, but also 
useful to position them in the great ongoing transformation); that the completion of such 
a process is possible (and thus that it is not fundamentally prevented by impeding 
factors, such as the “absence of an European demos”); that it is desirable (the 
controversy on European “technocracy”, based on a very specific and restricted concept 
of democracy, is well known); that, in compliance with the true essence of 
constitutionalism, this process must consist in a stronger limitation of power and in a 
broader protection of rights.  
 
In relation to all these points, there are ideologically-characterized positions and 
fears within individual States, while powerful counter-actions are prepared.  
 
In this transition, which has emerged with indeterminate results (the very idea of 
Europe has been jeopardized by a persisting economic crisis with partly unprecedented 
characteristics), there are other sources of complexity: the reaction to the lack of 
achievement of an European constitutional Charter; the effort to provide deflationary 
State policies with a constitutional ground (in addition to treaties), exerting an 
unprecedented pressure on social rights; in connection with this, constitutional 
precedents such as the German, dissonant with the “European Constitutional logic” and 
fitting the “Treaty logic”. 
 
A further source of complexity concerns the possibility for the EU to join the 
European Convention of Human Rights, although it is a source of a positive complexity, 
such as the one that arises from the now possible construction of a “constitutional” 
problem, which lies before the political community as well as the lawyers’ community 
in Europe.  
 
 
II. STAGNATION OF THE CONSTITUENT PROCESS AND CRISIS OF WELFARE SYSTEMS 
 
It would be an unwise abstraction not to consider that the efforts to create the 
“Constitutional Treaty”, and their failure, have been accompanied by a crisis of welfare 
systems, and have been followed by a broader economic crisis characterized by 
distortions in financial markets. We must take this into account to understand why, after 
the referenda in France and in the Netherlands, it has been necessary to rule out 
“recovery” attempts in the forms provided by Declaration n. 30, attached to the 
Constitutional Treaty
2
: the possibilities offered by such a provision were immediately 
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jeopardized by the “freezing” of ratification processes in various States, starting from 
the United Kingdom (and without even getting to the point of considering the issue of 
the effectiveness of a Declaration attached to a not yet ratified Treaty). Similarly, the 
proposal to build a “two-speed Europe”3, on the grounds of arts. 43 and 44 of the Union 
Treaty
4
, failed to get a foothold. When put to the test, the institutional tools prepared to 
face the difficulties of the ratification phase, which were predictable also on the grounds 
of the experience concerning the setbacks in the integration process, proved to be 
inadequate in the face of the tension – already detectable in the past, but now heightened 
by the economic contingency and the coincidental “enlargement” of the Union – 
between levels and methods of protection of “civil” rights (or rights “corresponding to 
duties of justice”) and “social” rights (or rights “corresponding to duties of material 
aid”)5. Social rights – for well-established and ancient historical and cultural reasons, 
rooted in the deepest strata of the Western legal experience
6
 – are rights defined “by 
proximity” (within the family, the community, the State), and, in the Nation-State 
experience, they are understood in relation to the guarantees established for them by 
boundaries, in the “protective”7 function that is ensured by boundaries. Civil rights, on 
                                                                                                                                               
one or more Member States have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter will 
be referred to the European Council”. 
3
 A position repeatedly expressed by HABERMAS, J. (2005) La creazione di un’identità europea è 
necessaria e possibile?, in L’Occidente diviso, Roma-Bari, pp. 53ff., and, with reference to the following 
lack of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, Habermas: «Gli Stati-nazione rimangono protagonisti 
ma devono cambiare la loro immagine di sé», interview by N. Vallinoto, in Il Corriere della Sera, 25 
marzo 2007, where criticism is expressed towards “a model of Europe as a convoy whose pace is 
established by the slowest vehicle” (“modello di Europa quale convoglio il cui incedere è determinato dal 
mezzo tra tutti più lento”). 
4
 See arts. 43 and 44 of the Treaty on the European Union as modified by the Treaty of Nice, 26 February 
2001, art. 1, nn. 11, 12 e 13. 
5
 Referring to the terms used by NUSSBAUM, M.C. (2000) Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid. 
Cicero’s Problematic Legacy, in Journal of Political Philosophy, 8, pp. 176ff., trad. it. Giustizia e aiuto 
materiale, Bologna, 2008, may shield our analysis from the constraints of the controversial distinction 
between civil and social rights, assuming a meaning of the two poles of such a conceptual couple which 
suggests its persistent usefulness. 
6
 NUSSBAUM (2000) –examining the issue firstly from the point of view of duties, looking for a theory of 
duties of material aid aimed at the “fair exchange among nations”– observes the construction of the 
asymmetry between duties of justice and duties of material aid, in a complete form, already in Cicero’s 
De Officiis, and highlights the persistent influence of this work in the entire “Western philosophical and 
political tradition”, up to contemporary justice theories, also through “Kant’s analysis on cosmopolitan 
duties” (with respect to “Kant’s debt to Cicero”, cf., by NUSSBAUM, M.C. (1977)  Kant and Stoic 
Cosmopolitanism, in Bohmann, J. (ed.) Perpetual Peace, Cambridge, pp. 25ff.). The approach suggested 
by M.C. Nussbaum recalls an important cultural factor of strong resistance to the European integration 
process. This approach is here considered outside the well-known debate on cosmopolitanism and 
globalization processes; about these topics, see the useful reconstruction of CAMERLENGO, Q. (2007) 
Contributo a una teoria del diritto costituzionale cosmopolitico, Milano. 
7
 Some studies on welfare systems – State-centered studies clearly owing to Rokkan’s theories – support 
an interpretation of Europeanization (and globalization) processes in the light of the concept of 
“boundaries”. They identify a hard to diffuse tension between the “sharing of social rights”, built on 
«closure» mechanisms – assuming the existence of a clearly demarcated and cohesive community, whose 
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the other hand, can be extended, universalized, without renouncing national cohesion 
within boundaries, because States can negotiate their guarantees, also by establishing 
supranational jurisdictional bodies.  
 
Therefore, the hypothesis is the following: the universalization of civil rights 
may continue in a treaty logic; the universalization of social rights cannot be carried out 
outside of a complete European constitutional order, in a welfare system that is uniform 
and highly centralized (from an European point of view), where boundaries, in their 
protective function against the erosive power of asymmetries and diseconomies deriving 
from the new globalization, are instead those of Europe (and the extension of such 
boundaries, the modalities of their formation and the relation of the new order with the 
very concept of Nation-State would present in new and unexplored ways the issue of 
material justice in the light of the distribution of global wealth and of a new equality 
paradigm, as a transnational principle). Moreover, because the standards of protection of 
social rights in individual States are challenged by the integration process, the latter is 
especially hindered by the issue of social rights. Before this issue, the expansive and 
constructive force of European constitutional case-law (so far for the most part 
virtuously and effectively carried out by supranational courts and constitutional judges 
of individual Countries, also thanks to the stimulus provided by ordinary tribunals, in a 
coherent network) is destined to fade out. 
 
This is the fundamental reason why the establishment of the principle of 
indivisibility of rights – at a time where its inclusion in the Constitutional Treaty 
through the Charter of Nice, and the subsequent recognition in Lisbon that the Charter 
and the principle established therein have the same value of the Treaty
8
, was being 
                                                                                                                                               
members feel that they belong to the same whole and that they are linked by reciprocity ties vis‐à‐vis 
common risks and similar needs – on the one hand, and European integration, which is instead based on 
“opening...  on weakening or tearing apart those spatial demarcations and closure practices that Nation 
States have built to protect themselves” (FERRERA, M. (2005) The Boundaries of Welfare, Oxford, p. 2). 
From this point of view, in the European integration process the “spatial architecture of social citizenship, 
that is, the territorial reach of solidarity, the identity of its constituent communities, and, last but not least, 
the ultimate source of legitimate authority for the creation and the enforcement of rights” is at stake 
(FERRERA (2005) p. 51). This is a difficult process, from a cultural as well as a political point of view, if it 
is true that one can still support the idea of “a human right to boundaries, and to boundaries protecting 
men from each other as well as allowing them to freely and securely carry out a self-determined life” 
(KERSTING, W. (1998) Einleitung, in KERSTING, W. and CHWASZCZA, C. Politische Philosophie der 
internationalen Beziehungen, Frankfurt, p. 62).  
8
 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, Lisbon, 13 December 2007, art. 6, §1: “The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as 
adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties”. 
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considered – can be seen as a “spectacular”9 innovation. Such a principle, by linking the 
two spheres of social and civil rights (historically more than conceptually separated) 
programmatically raises the issue of the universalization of social rights, and thus of the 
very possibility of an European Constitution. 
 
 
III. THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
  
The issue of the universalization of social rights and its tension with the 
integration process, if used as a reference point while considering the path from the 
Treaty to the Constitution, highlight some questionable stances which have confronted 
each other in the analysis of the European phenomenon.  
 
On the one hand, they undermine negationist theories, which expect to apply the 
post-revolutionary, analytical paradigm of modernity to current transformations, and to 
constrict constitutionalism in the political representation circuit, assuming that this will 
lead from the demos to parliaments. Moreover, such theories experience constitutional 
jurisdictions – especially supranational – as inappropriate deviations. Consequently, 
they consider Europe as a land where animalistic, dominant and uncontrolled market 
forces are unleashed, with law inevitably subjugated to them. Such is the thesis of 
“democracy in one country”, of “national paths to constitutionalism”. However, the 
problem of fundamental rights and of their jurisdictional protection also against the 
malfunctioning of the representation circuit, by containing the concentration of power 
deriving from the affirmation of democracy by appointment and from the domination of 
national executive powers, reveals that its weakness lies in the theoretical categories 
adopted. 
 
On the other hand, the abovementioned issues undermine the voluntarist rhetoric 
whereby every setback in the integration process is a cultural disagreement, a regional 
delay, a strategic deficiency with narrow scope. By refuting these assumptions, they 
pose once again the issue of the Union’s “foundation”, because the asymmetry in the 
universalization process reduces the prospect of a whole European order whose essence 
would consist in the “indivisible” guarantee of rights. The most typical feature of the 
European constitutionalization process, indeed, consists in its resistance to one of the 
most enduring paradigms of the history of legal thought, which grounds the concepts of 
Nation-State and of State sovereignty and, in connection with this, the concept of 
citizenship as belonging-subjection: the paradigm whereby, in its most organic and 
structured formulation, every political entity stems from the appropriation of a land, 
from which every order moves along, a radical title from which all other relations, of 
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 ZILLER, J. (2003) La nuova Costituzione europea, Bologna, p. 17, and PINELLI, C. (2003) La Carta dei 
diritti, la cittadinanza, la vita democratica dell’Unione, in Bassanini, F. and Tiberi, G. (eds.) Una 
Costituzione per l’Europa, Bologna, p. 37. 
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possession and of ownership, public and private, and every social and international 
right
10
, are derived. Moreover, it is through conflict, always “rather tumultuously”11, 
that land occupation is achieved. 
 
The progressive formation of the European constitutional order deviates from 
this model, from the “archetype of a constitutive legal process”12, due to its peculiar 
traits: “non-discontinuity” in its relations with States, because the formation of the 
European order takes place according to law, and not trough ruptures consisting in 
absolute, self-legitimated and sovereign acts
13
; independence in its grounds from a 
demos identified through cohesion factors referring to a primordial, original and eternal 
ground, raised to a “national conscience” into which blood, soil and cultural ties 
merge
14
; grounds which lie instead in the common constitutional traditions and in the 
deriving judicial production of law.  
 
                                                 
10
 “In some form, the constitutive process of a land-appropriation is found at the beginning of the history 
of every settled people, every commonwealth, every empire... Not only logically, but also historically, 
land-appropriation precedes the order that follows from it. It constitutes the original spatial order, the 
source of all further concrete order and all further law...All further property relations –communal or 
individual, public or private property, and all forms of possession and use in society and international 
law– are derived from this radical title”: SCHMITT, C. Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus 
Publicum Europaeum, Köln, 1950 and then Berlin, 1974, English translation (from the 1974 edition) The 
Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, New York, 2003, p. 48. 
The “resistance” and the diffusion of this approach in the conceptions of Nation-State is not undermined 
by the –instead very controversial– idea that Carl Schmitt develops from it in relation to the identification 
of the nòmos in the “legal order” rather than in the “norm”, in contrast with what he defines as “the 
presumption of an exclusive prevalence of a Keynesian “abstract normativism” (see SCHMITT, C. (1934) 
Ueber die drei Arten des Rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens, Hamburg, trad. it. I tre tipi di pensiero 
giuridico, in Miglio, G. and Schiera, P. (eds.) (1979) Le categorie del “politico”, Bologna, pp. 247ff. note 
3); he declares to share this idea with Santi Romano (in his book L’ordinamento Giuridico, p. 260), even 
if he considers the “terminological and conceptual component of “legal order” as not any more belonging 
to “the useful combined terms, because it can be used to hide the difference between a thought based on 
rules and a thug based on the legal order” (SCHMITT (1934) p. 251). In fact, the concept of “birth of a 
nation” with the establishment of a boundary is, to a certain extent, independent from constructions 
“based on an actual order” or “institutional” or, in an extreme sense, “decisionists”: and this degree of 
independence supports its persuasive strength.     
11
 SCHMITT (1950) p. 46 “... at times, the right to land arose from overflowing migrations of peoples and 
campaigns of conquest and, at other times, from successful defense of a country against foreigners”. 
12
 SCHMITT (1950) p. 47. 
13
 See FIORAVANTI, M. (2005) Il Trattato costituzionale europeo: una nuova tappa del processo 
costituente in Europa, in Vacca, G. (ed.) Dalla Convenzione alla Costituzione. Rapporto 2005 della 
Fondazione Istituto Gramsci sull’integrazione europea, Bari, p. 108; and, on the “impossible tabula 
rasa”, ZILLER (2003) La nuova Costituzione europea. 
14
 The contrast between “people’s nation” (Volksnation) and “citizens’ nation” –with the latter distancing 
itself from the historical experience of the Nation-State– can be found in HABERMAS, J. (1998) Una 
costituzione per l’Europa? Commento a Dieter Grimm, in L’inclusione dell’altro, Milano, p. 171. 
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The “grounds”, therefore, lie in judicially-sanctioned legitimacy: the law 
produced by judges derives from the people – from European people – because judicial 
bodies can be considered as democratically legitimized; indirect legitimacy, mediated 
by law and by the subjection of judges to it, irrespective of the modalities of their 
formation. Judicial law-making builds the basis of the constitutional guarantee of rights, 
in which citizens identify themselves thanks to the strong links with constitutional 
traditions common to the European context. Legitimacy acts as a limitation to power, 
vis-à-vis politically representative authorities, but the essence of constitutionalism lies 
precisely in limitations of power, in the form in which it occurs.  
 
And yet, this is a form of “progressive” legitimacy: it is not possible to maintain 
that a judicially-built European Constitution, with courts in charge of its protection, has 
been established. Judicial law-making is the propelling force pushing towards the 
Constitution; but the final result cannot be reached without a fundamental political 
decision able to solve the issue of the asymmetry between civil and social rights and of 
their different possibilities of universalization, which cannot be faced with judicial 
techniques – no matter how refined by experience. This issue cannot be judicially 
solved because it involves the characters of the Welfare State in Europe, posing the 
problem of a new paradigm of equality on which to build a framework of constitutional 
rules inspired by a vision of economic relations according to a principle of justice 
(justice in relations among individuals and among different parts of the world). And, 
according to these principles, it is necessary to build an organization of public powers at 
European level, severing the subordination ties with States. It is thus a matter of 
creating constitutional parameters through political decisions, binding and guiding 
judges, who cannot move beyond the current acquis communautaire on the sole basis of 
their creative power; without this, the European Constitution risks to lose ground every 
time States experience economic turmoil.  
 
If, programmatically, this working hypothesis is accepted on a methodological 
level (imposing a tight and permanent integration between the historical and the 
“positive” legal approach), it would be possible to consider in a less ideological light the 
experience of social rights in Europe and of the whole integration process itself, seen as 
a to-be-completed constituent process. 
 
 
IV. CONCEPTS OF MARKET AND SOCIAL RIGHTS  
 
It is well known that a considerable part of scholars has often adopted a 
dissenting stance, strongly critical of Europe’s “founding fathers”, building the tòpos of 
the “social frigidity”15 of the constitutive Treaty. 
                                                 
15
 This expression was coined by MANCINI, G. F. (1988) Principi fondamentali di diritto del lavoro 
nell’ordinamento della Comunità europea, in the Conference Proceedings on Il lavoro nel diritto 
comunitario e l’ordinamento italiano, held in Parma, 30 and 31 October 1985, Padova, p. 33. Widely 
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Actually – if one rejects the theory of the “duplicity” of the “founding fathers”, 
as creators of welfare systems in their respective countries but at the same time 
uninterested in the guarantee of social rights in Europe, considering this as an 
“historical mystery”16 – it is necessary to recognize the original idea and aim: to build 
an European, open market, leaving the “social sovereignty” of States in its own national 
boundaries, where welfare systems were being built, and where social rights constituted 
the object of post-war Constitutions which, in different forms, had guaranteed them by 
creating compendiums where they were established as principles. The opening and the 
integration of markets – in the expectations of the framers of the European order – 
would promote and imply the progressive harmonization of social systems towards the 
highest levels of guarantee
17
. The idea of a market based on perfect competition as a 
direct and autonomous regulator of social order was unknown to the “founding fathers”. 
The “fixed social fund dogma”18, whereby it is possible to assume that salaries and 
occupational levels depend exclusively on the competition on the labour market and on 
the dynamics of the economic cycle, and through which the ideology of the self-
regulating force of the market is established, was unknown to the cultural references 
which inspired them. The market is instead embedded
19
 – structured, built – in social 
and legal conditions and rules which make it possible
20
. And these rules are not 
generated by the market; nor can the market organize itself
21
. 
                                                                                                                                               
recalled and accepted, it was re-used by its creator in different times, although against a different 
historical background and notwithstanding divergent analytical and reconstructive contributions. It is also 
possible to find it in MANCINI, G. F. (1995) Regole giuridiche e relazioni sindacali nell’Unione Europea, 
in AA.VV., Protocollo sociale di Maastricht: realtà e prospettive, Roma, e in MANCINI, G. F. (2004) 
L’incidenza del diritto comunitario sul diritto del lavoro degli Stati membri, in Democrazia e 
costituzionalismo nell’Unione europea, Bologna, pp. 259ff. 
16
 ALLEGRETTI, U. (2004) I diritti sociali, in I diritti fondamentali e le Corti in Europa, Seminario Luiss 
(Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali), 21 maggio, paper.  
17
 In opposition to the “social frigidity” tòpos, a “strong «social empathy» of the founding fathers” was 
thus observed, notwithstanding the “«misery» of the provisions” of the Treaty of Rome: GIUBBONI, S. 
(2003) Diritti sociali e mercato. La dimensione sociale dell’integrazione europea, Bologna, pp. 44ff.   
18
 For a critical stance on such a “dogma”, see MINGIONE, E. (1997) Sociologia della vita economica, 
Roma, spec. pp. 84ff.  
19
 On this concept, the fundamental reference is POLANYI, K. The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Originins of Our Time, Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1944 and Beacon Press, Boston, 
2001, trad. ital. La grande trasformazione. Le origini economiche e politiche della nostra epoca, Torino, 
1974. 
20
 The “founding fathers”, actually, worked in the context of a complex set of relations in the economy 
and in the legal order which, contrary to the “economic nationalism” of the 1930s, has been defined as 
“embedded liberalism” by RUGGIE, J. G. (1982) International Regimes, Transactions, and Chenge: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in International Organization, vol. 36, n. 2, 
passim and 393. And they were well aware of their time. 
21
 Gathering some elements from the analysis of the events “in the half century between 1879 and 1929”, 
Polanyi highlights the “destructive tensions” deriving from the self-regulatory claims of the market, 
observing that as soon as the mechanism of the self-regulating market was started, its impact on society 
was so violent that almost instantly and without any previous change of opinion, powerful protective 
reactions were set in motion. He observes: “...Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result 
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The idea of a market as the result of a series of atomized relations, of a market 
based on the postulation of perfect competition, which generates “allocative efficiency 
and maximization of the general well-being”, working “without any prolonged social 
and human contact between two or more parts”, where “there is no place for bargaining, 
negotiation, complaints and reciprocal settlements” and where “the various operators 
bargaining with each other do not need to enter in recurring and continuous 
relationships after which they would get to know each other well”22, such a market does 
not exist, or at least it does not exist in its assumed purity, and is mostly an ideological 
abstraction
23
. 
 
It is not, however, the market which the “founding fathers” had in mind. Nor did 
they believe social contexts and legal rules to be the by-product of the market (which 
tends to be, instead, the neo-classical approach): such a view, in case its divisive 
potential had been overlooked, would have prevented from understanding phenomena 
such as the regional diversities of productive systems and social exclusion, from 
preparing appropriate counter-policies, which are instead a characteristic of the 
European order in its most developed stage, and the establishment of “fourth 
generation” rights in the Charter of Nice and subsequently in the Treaty of Lisbon. It 
would have prevented the understanding of dynamics and characters typical of welfare 
systems (as it prevents today the understanding of the features of the new globalization, 
ad of its influence in the European space): and instead, precisely as “welfare creators”, 
the “founding fathers” had it very clear that the market is a construction, not a “natural” 
                                                                                                                                               
of a double movement: the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was 
accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones. While on the one hand markets spread all over 
the face of the globe and the amount of goods involved grew to unbelievable proportions, on the other 
hand a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the 
action of the market relative to labour, land, and money. While the organization of world commodity 
markets, world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard gave an 
unparalleled momentum to the mechanism of markets, a deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist 
the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against the perils inherent 
in a self-regulating market system--this was the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age” 
(POLANYI, K. (1944) chapter 6).The risk for society inherent to the utopian principle of a self-regulated 
market is therefore a historical evidence (POLANYI (1944)).  
22
 HIRSCHMAN, A. O. (1987)  L’economia politica come scienza morale e sociale, Napoli, p. 87. 
23
 The “«deviations»” from the ideal competition model are “frequent and important”, and nonetheless 
“economists who are favourable to the market...have frequently...minimized these deviations from the 
ideal competition model, in an effort to present the reality of an imperfect competition as very close to the 
ideal one. By doing so, they have made an effort to provide the market system with economic legitimacy. 
But, at the same time, they have sacrificed the sociological legitimacy which could have been rightly 
asked due to the way in which, differently than the perfect competition model, most markets work in the 
real world. Only recently economists developed a certain number of approaches which no longer consider 
the deviations from the competition model as sinful or unimportant ...” HIRSCHMAN (1987) [translation 
mine]. 
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phenomenon, and a construction founded on largely legal rules, and whose development 
is shaped by legal rules
24
.  
 
The logic of a legal construction of the market
25
 – adopted by the “founding 
fathers” – actually constitutes the ground for the legal technique and the content of the 
Treaties in their original form. 
 
If the goal is to regulate the markets, so as to guarantee the full autonomy of 
Member States in the discipline of working conditions and in the definition of social 
protection systems
26
, the same principle of competition, which is nonetheless a 
cornerstone of the order prepared for Europe, must be limited whenever it can result in 
forms of social dumping, that is, when it forces States with higher levels of social 
protection and wages to downward chases of States where these standards are lower: 
such is the framework of the CECA Treaty
27
. 
 
Moreover, in the Treaty of Rome, policies aimed at supporting the living 
standards of rural populations were pursued through market control as well as the 
limitation of competition; in the meantime, in the field of social security, measures of 
                                                 
24
 Economic liberalism, understood as self-regulation of the market, is historically incapable of hindering 
forces pushing towards the dissolution of social orders, even when its ideological power is at its fullest, 
because “the protection of men, of nature and of the productive order” always means “an interference in 
the labour market and in that of the land” as well as in the money market, damaging “ipso facto... the self-
regulation of the system”: it is possible to say that this issue, that Polanyi attributes to the time between 
the end of the XIX century and the Great Depression of 1929, is recurrent in the observation of the 
economic phenomenon ( POLANYI (1944) P. 275). 
25
 The “founding fathers’” idea, where the consciousness of the necessary character of markets and the 
inescapable need to face its “shortcomings” and “failures” are reconciled, is extremely relevant even 
today, in a historical period where the “intellectual rejection of the market mechanism”, which led to 
“radical proposals”, has been followed by a “dramatic” change of climate and “the tables are now turned. 
The virtues of the market mechanism are now assumed to be so pervasive that qualifications seem 
unimportant. Any pointer to the defects of the market mechanism appears to be, in the present mood, 
strangely old-fashioned and contrary to contemporary culture ... One set of prejudices has given way to 
another – opposite – set of preconceptions. Yesterday’s unexamined faith has become today’s heresy, and 
yesterday’s heresy is not the new superstition”: Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 111. 
26
 The “founding fathers’” stance is, therefore, very distant from the “distortion argument”, whereby 
“social protection is different from other expenses financed by taxes because not only it costs money, but 
it also distorts some key economic decisions”, so that “the welfare state is not only too expensive, but it is 
also the cause of Europe’s economic malaise”. Such a position “is in some cases developed by arguing 
that any interference with a market economy distorts decisions; imposes non-zero marginal tax rates; 
forces us to abandon an homogeneous, common playing field”. A position that “presents a problem”: “it 
assumes a world of perfectly competitive and balanced markets, a theoretical framework where the issues 
causing the very existence of the welfare state are absent”: ATKINSON, A. B. (2005) La politica sociale 
dell’Unione Europea nel contesto della globalizzazione, in Studi economici, special issue, 26 [translation 
mine]. 
27
 See GIUBBONI (2003) p. 49. 
SANDRO STAIANO 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 2 (June 2014) pp. 25-45  ISSN: 2340-9592 
35 
 
forced harmonization, which could have led to downward chases according to the 
economic cycle, were ruled out. In sum, a regulation aimed at correcting the 
spontaneous dynamics of the market in the fields where social costs would be too 
burdensome was being pursued, while these dynamics were left undisturbed whenever 
they were thought to support a desirable harmonization. From this perspective, social 
policies, already on the grounds of art. 51 of the Treaty, were kept on the national level; 
and differences were accepted and assumed, and coordinated only as far as it was 
necessary in a context where the guarantee of freedom of movement for workers and 
freedom of establishment were being pursued
28
. 
 
Hence, the “founding fathers” were not affected by any kind of social 
indifference, nor did they aim to support and protect the “natural” market dynamics; if 
anything, they harboured the utopia of a natural, upwards harmonization of welfare 
systems in accordance with the European context. A virtuous utopia, because it 
introduces a mitigating factor of inequality, supporting the overcoming of imbalances 
and diseconomies, in the European integration process. An utopia nonetheless, because 
the deterministic faith in the certain achievement of the expected aims thanks to the 
implementation of a “first static engine”, able to start an infallible mechanism, is 
illusory. Such a natural upward harmonization of social systems, indeed, does not occur 
in the concrete historical process: it is, rather, a conflicting result, achieved in stops and 
starts, and exposed to throwbacks. Experience suggests that the biggest obstacle to the 
achievement of that original objective is the difficulty of regulation due to the 
inefficiency of decision-making processes inspired to the logic of the Treaties 
(unanimous decisions according to the modules of the intergovernmental method). It is, 
in sum, a matter of constitutionalization deficit, not considered by the “founding 
fathers”, which distances the integration process from the historical premises that they 
had envisaged. 
 
The events surrounding the Treaty confirm this tendency to the oscillation 
towards solutions eroding both the national paths to welfare systems and those policies 
aimed at favouring the expansion of social protection mechanism, in the absence of a 
codification of European constitutional principles which individual States and the 
Community’s decisional bodies would have to comply with. 
 
With Maastricht, from the point of view of the threshold imposed to public 
deficit and to inflation rates and with the resulting significant limitation of independent 
macroeconomic national policies, the “flexibility” of social protection systems is 
established as a value, as an expression of “modernity”, vis-à-vis the old, bad habit of 
deficit spending in individual States. Thus, the “Maastricht spirit” still lingers in 
Europe, surviving the modifications to the Treaty. It does so in the inflexibility of the 
“Stability Pact” as a tool of constraint and control on economic and financial choices. 
                                                 
28
 GIUBBONI (2003) pp. 69ff. 
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And it is reinforced by the implementation of the “mutual recognition”29 model, where a 
glimpse of the self-regulating market is observable
30
 together with the tendency to the 
erosion of national guarantees offered by national welfare systems. 
 
In this context, the resistance of boundaries in their protective function is at 
issue, with the principle of the application to workers of the law of their country of 
destination, with the ruling out, from a legal point of view, of the principle of 
exportability for social assistance benefits or for non-contributory benefits in general, 
with the national control on many social citizenship benefits. This is a limit to 
deregulation, to the freedom of action of the market. However, it is a weak limitation if 
its function is to guarantee the current levels of social protection in individual States, 
precisely because in individual States the direct public provision of services takes a step 
back: the producing State gives way to the regulating State. 
 
Only when the “logic of the Treaty” is weakened, giving way to the “logic of the 
Constitution”, the tendency to deregulation is efficiently moderated as well: the 
affirmation of the majority vote and the creation of EU-level rules in the social field 
lead to a level of protection which is superior than those of the most advanced national 
systems
31
. When this occurs, boundary recede; not any more by leaving full scope for 
social dumping, but rather by allowing for higher levels of guarantee, pursuant to the 
key principle of the indivisibility between civil and social rights. 
 
Therefore, these two forces on the European scene – on the one hand the self-
regulation of the market, pushing on the standards of guarantee of social rights within 
national boundaries incapable of preventing, in the logic of the Treaty, phases of 
significant erosion, and on the other hand the setting up of an European system of 
guarantee of those very rights, in the logic of the Constitution – are in perpetual tension, 
and their mutual affirmation and retreat, also under the influence of the economic cycle, 
are mostly dependent on the future of the European Constitution.  
 
                                                 
29
 The “mutual recognition” principle, whereby any legally produced and commercialized good must be 
allowed to access the market of the other member States, is rooted in the Court of Justice case-law, and 
was extended from the sphere of the free movement of goods to that of the free movement of services and 
persons by the White Paper from the Commission to the European Council on Completing the Internal 
Market, 1985, spec., §58. By virtue of the White Paper, it is the market, in the competition between 
systems, to establish the most convenient level of regulation, curbing public interferences. 
30
 See LO FARO, A. (1999) Funzioni e finzioni della contrattazione collettiva comunitaria. La 
contrattazione collettiva come risorsa dell’ordinamento giuridico comunitario, Milano, pp. 65ff., who 
theorizes mutual recognition as a “radical alternative, and not a mere technical variation of the 
harmonization strategy” and as a “potential drift towards deregulation”, when not “equally employed as a 
general criterion for the establishment and functioning of the single market” [translation mine]. 
31
 GIUBBONI (2003) p. 106. 
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Moreover, at the present time the spirit of Maastricht has resumed lingering in a 
significant way, supported by the claim to include the “budget balance” obligation in 
national Constitutions (quite explicitly expressing the will to impose a vision of 
economic relations based on development models of individual States where growth is 
mostly fuelled by exports, generating national closure and, where party systems are 
weaker and more vulnerable, plebiscitary regressions). 
 
In Italy, such an obligation has been carried out through an extensive and 
pervasive reform of the Constitution, which has affected not only art. 81 – which now 
establishes the principle of the “balance between income and expenditures” of the State 
budget, “in consideration of the negative and positive phases of the economic cycle”, 
allowing debt only “in exceptional circumstances” – but also art. 97 and art. 199, in 
order to extend the same principle to all public administrations and local governments, 
as well as art. 117, in order to make the “harmonization of public budgets” an exclusive 
competence of the State. 
 
Any doubts on the conforming force of these innovations would be dispersed by 
the observation of art. 5 of the constitutional law n. 1 of 20 April 2012, which, by 
modifying art. 81, has established the content of the new type of law which can 
authorize debt (a law adopted by the Parliament “by an absolute majority for each 
Chamber”: art. 81, paragraph 2) and has affirmed that “exceptional circumstances” 
under which this can be justified are “serious economic recessions”, “financial crisis” 
and “natural disasters”. Moreover, the “new type” of law n. 243 of 24 December 2012 
(“Provisions for the implementation of the budget balance principle pursuant to art. 81, 
paragraph 6, of the Constitution”) further restricts the mentioned exceptional 
circumstances by specifying them, where it establishes that these consist in “times of 
serious economic recessions also concerning the euro area or the entire European 
Union” or in “exceptional events, beyond State control, including serious financial 
crises and serious natural disasters, with relevant repercussions on the general financial 
situation of the country” (art. 6, paragraph 2). Moreover, paragraph 3 of article 6 
establishes that the resulting “temporary deviations of the structural balance from the 
planned objective”32 must be determined “after consultation with the European 
Commission”, on the grounds of a report updating the planned objectives in the field of 
public finance, clarifying “the nature and the duration of the deviation” and establishing 
“the goals towards which available resources must be channelled”, as well as defining 
the “re-orientation plan towards the planned objective, making its duration proportional 
to the seriousness of the events”. 
 
Such a rigour is explained by the tendency of the Italian system to strictly 
conform to the obligations imposed by the European Union. The Europlus Pact of 11 
March 2011 (not binding from a strictly legal point of view, but considered as a 
                                                 
32
 Translation mine. 
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commitment because it was signed by Heads of State and Prime Ministers in the euro 
area, thus affecting their international credibility) already established an obligation to 
insert in Constitutions or national laws the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(individual States were allowed to freely choose the form as far as the discussed rules 
were binding both at national and at sub-national level). 
 
Then, Directive 2011/85/EU established an obligation to adopt rules concerning 
the formulation of budgets and monitoring mechanisms, aimed at ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficits of States in the euro zone. 
 
With law n. 114 of 23 July 2012, Italy ratified the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (fiscal compact), 
that entered into force on 1 January 2013. It is this Treaty that establishes the duty to 
introduce in individual States, preferably through constitutional laws, the obligation to 
maintain balanced budgets or budget surpluses, controlling structural deficit, in 
accordance with the specific mid-term objective for each State of a yearly improvement 
of the corrected budget balance for the cycle amounting to more than 0,5% of the GNP, 
when the national debt is over 60%. Deviations from the mid-term objective are allowed 
only temporarily, in exceptional circumstances, in case of unusual events that the 
involved State cannot control and that could cause significant repercussions on the 
financial situation of the public administration, or in times of serious recession. In any 
case, however, the deficit must not undermine the  sustainability of the mid-term 
budget. State parties are bound to initiate automatic correction mechanisms in case of 
significant deviations from the reference value in the relation between the national debt 
and the GNP, and are obliged to implement corrective measures within a specific 
deadline. 
 
Against this background - which defines the context and clarifies the rationale  
of the mentioned reforms to the Italian Constitution – it is possible to notice not only the 
will to prevent deficit spending policies in all cases, but also the unrelatedness, even 
more than the explicit aversion, to Keynesian economic cultures, together with an 
inspiration towards theories which claimed to provide pernicious relations between debt 
and GNP above a certain threshold with an “irrefutable scientific basis” (only to then 
observe that some theoretical conclusions are not at all inevitable and even that certain 
analytical results were based on trivial material mistakes during the use of computer 
programmes
33
).  
                                                 
33
 This is very well epitomized by the case of the analytical hypotheses and the theoretical assumptions of 
Carmen Reinhart and Kennet Rogoff, Harvard economists, according to whom when the debt is higher 
than 90% of the GNP, economic growth becomes too low (REINHART, C. and ROGOFF, K. (2010) Growth 
in a Time of Debt, working paper 15639, Cambridge, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639). This theory 
has met wide consensus, and was considered also in a political context as  “the economists’ view”: an 
irrefutable statement, a starting point to define any serious economic policy. However, these assumptions 
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The Spanish constitutional framework is very close to the Italian: the reform of 
art. 135 of the Constitution of 27 September 2011 established the obligation for all 
public administrations to conform to the budget stability principle (estabilidad 
presupuestaria) and the prohibition for the State and the Autonomous Communities to 
incur in a structural deficit above the threshold established by the European Union.  
 
France, whose law of constitutional reform n. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 had 
inserted the “budget balance in public administrations” objective in art. 34 of the 
Constitution, did not deem appropriate to update the Constitution, even after the 
ratification of the fiscal compact Treaty, and rather chose the tool of an organic law to 
regulate the determination of mid-term objectives of the budget of public 
administrations and of the yearly structural and effective balance, the corrective 
mechanisms in case of deviation of public finances from the programmed objectives, 
and the institution of a monitoring body (Haut Conseil des finances publiques). 
 
With different degrees of resistance, individual countries have conformed with 
the strict approach adopted in Germany, putting to the test the structural characters of 
their economic and welfare models.  
 
 
V. SOVEREIGNTY, PROTECTIVE FUNCTION OF BOUNDARIES, EUROPEAN CONSTITUENT 
PROCESS 
 
Moving beyond boundaries and thus beyond State sovereignty – potentially not 
compromising the levels of protection of social rights with rejection effects that could 
jeopardize the very perspective of European integration – is, then, implied in the 
European constitutionalization process.  
 
This is partly due to the conflicting events surrounding the conventional legal 
sources. It is however mostly imputable to the Court of Justice work, which impacts on 
                                                                                                                                               
are far from generally accepted in the scientific world. Equally authoritative and convincing theories 
identify (using the same data submitted by Reinhart and Rogoff) some negative relation between high 
debt and economic performance, but not a 90% threshold over which a significant relation between debt 
and low growth would be identifiable. In some cases – observable and actually observed – this relation is 
actually inverse: in 1990, Japan collapsed in a serious condition of debt only after the plunge of its 
growth. Moreover, other economists have questioned the completeness of the data used to maintain such 
hypothesis as well as the use of an unusual and questionable statistical procedure. Furthermore, an 
encoding mistake has been found in the use of Excel (see KRUGMAN, P. 2013) The Excel depression, in 
International Herald Tribune, 20-21, p. 7). In sum, unfortunately certain circumstances generate beliefs 
ascribable to scientism which, due to their conformity with contingently dominant ideological positions, 
are used as a basis for economic policies destined to generate economic depression (and to erode the 
systems of protection of social rights). 
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the very nature of the Treaties, transmitting them characters of constitutionalization
34
, in 
a dynamic phase and in part independently of the not always consistent results achieved 
in the political context and of their alternating successes and failures. It is the judicial 
formation of constitutional law that questions the exclusive and protective function of 
national boundaries; and it is against it that the strongest objections arise.  
 
However, in this general context – with a previously unseen magnitude, 
considering that it involves the very concept of law creation and undermines the 
distinction between civil law and common law systems – the issue of social rights 
remains a pitfall.  
 
Among supranational courts, indeed, approaches effectively protecting the 
freedoms of circulation are being established, but the techniques used to balance with 
social rights – even if they appear possible and have become habitual after Amsterdam 
(and the Albany judgment) – are affected by a fundamental limitation: the guarantee of 
social rights is still indirect, because it is established as long as the protection of social 
interests is involved by the pursuit of social objectives assumed as priorities within the 
European Union (thus, social rights can hardly be considered as subjective positions that 
can be directly justiciable). In this feature, an overturned perspective has been observed 
in comparison with national Constitution models, especially with the Italian
35
, whereby 
the centrality of the protection of the individual actually arises from the guarantee of 
social rights, and to that protection the action of public powers is subordinated in its 
pursuit of social objectives. However, the Italian constitutional model of guarantee of 
social rights precisely acts within its national boundaries; in comparison, the European 
model is reversed, because it stops before national boundaries. A change of perspective 
could only occur if a common statute of fundamental rights were established at 
European level, as a constitutional principle able to impose compliance by creating a 
correspondence between social rights and “material aid” duties. 
 
This central and unavoidable issue persists, also (and perhaps especially) when 
considered in the light of governance models, based on “promotional law”, in which 
there is the expectation to move beyond the limitation of the harmonization of the 
national social legislation.  
                                                 
34
 An outcome deemed “revolutionary”, although “quiet”, by WEILER, J. H. H. 1994) A Quiet Revolution: 
The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, in Comparative Political Studies, pp. 510ff. 
35
 In this sense, while commenting on art. 136 of the Treaty after Amsterdam, see LUCIANI, M. 2000) 
Diritti sociali e integrazione europea, in Politica del diritto, n. 3, especially p. 379, where it is observed 
that “in the constitutional model, social rights are understood as the premise and the aim of public 
powers... The constitutional protection is, in any case, directly aimed at rights while the social interests is 
only indirectly achieved, thanks to the fulfilment of the former” [translation mine]. In the context of the 
Community, on the other hand, social interests “presented as objectives” are directly protected by the 
Treaty, whereas “rights remain in the background and the possibility for their fulfilment is connected to 
the need to realize social objectives”, resuming their “Reflexrechte status” [translation mine]. 
SANDRO STAIANO 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 2 (June 2014) pp. 25-45  ISSN: 2340-9592 
41 
 
We could consider the case of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)
36
. The 
Method is based on the idea of a soft law realized in mediated political decisions, with 
shared objectives, made “reasonable” by “technical” indicators (ultimately, the control 
on such a “reasonableness” could be carried out by the Court of Justice37). Aside from 
the fears that the OMC may erode the social acquis communautaire, “based on hard 
rules and in any case considered, despite its fragility, socially healthy”38, it is not 
completely clear what kind of relationship should exist between the OMC 
(“promotional”) rules and those of protection of fundamental rights: the latter should be 
understood as an “a priori ... reference framework influencing the very structure” of the 
OMC , or as a “corrective ... a posteriori” of the OMC39. Such a distinction would be 
quite relevant with respect to justiciability in cases of infringement of subjective 
positions implied by policies in individual States, if the OMC were explicitly mentioned 
by the Treaty as a regulatory model to be respected by Community and national 
authorities: the decisions of the former, aimed at the differentiation of interventions 
according to the peculiarities of each national order, would put the provisions of the 
Treaty closer to the decisions of individual States, using the Treaty as an integrated 
normative standard. However, if that were the case, the OMC could be hardly related to 
the soft law framework; rather, it could function as a guideline principle, so as to offer a 
wide spectrum of interpretative possibilities, but it would not be possible to reduce it to 
a mere orientation criterion, entrusted to voluntary implementation mechanisms and 
sustained by merely political incentives. On the other hand, if that were not the case, 
namely if the OMC brought its object outside the scope of regulation, it would be 
incompatible with the need to protect fundamental civil and social rights; such rights, by 
their nature, must find – and do find in European constitutional traditions – a foundation 
and a guarantee in rules imposing themselves at the highest level of the legal order. 
Therefore, the OMC could offer, in judicial contexts, elements of comparison in the 
logic process of interpretation. Alternatively, its indications could be translated into 
hard law, so that the OMC would be nothing more than an orderly way of acquisition of 
factual elements used to ground a legislative decision, but outside of (and before) the 
strict legal path which leads to such a decision. 
 
                                                 
36
 This expression can be found in the proceedings of the Lisbon European Council of 2000; the 
Amsterdam Treaty defines the OMC as a tool of cooperation among States in the field of social policies. 
37
 Furthermore, it is possible to note that – in the complex reconstructive polymorphism observable with 
respect to the OMC – the “indeterminate” and “flexible” character of the rules has been considered as a 
way to take “the concrete definition of rights [away] from the courts”, whereas according to the results of 
the legal analysis of judicial systems it is exactly the “disappearance of the strict distinction between 
creation and implementation” that leads to the judicial formation of law: for the counterintuitive 
conclusion, see BARBERA, M. (2006) Introduzione. I problemi teorici e pratici posti dal Metodo di 
coordinamento aperto delle politiche sociali, in Barbera, M. (ed.) Nuove forme di regolazione: il Metodo 
aperto di coordinamento delle politiche sociali, Milano, p. 23 [translation mine]. 
38
 CARUSO, B. Il diritto del lavoro tra hard law e soft law: nuove funzioni e nuove tecniche normative, in 
Nuove forme di regolazione, p. 91. 
39
 The alternative is problematically submitted by LO FARO (1999) pp. 354ff. 
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To date, in any case, the OMC does not appear to be crucial. 
 
Even considering it as potentially productive of good results, the OMC does not 
lend itself to generalizations because it applies in the field of social policy; whereas in 
other areas – where controversies are harsher, as in the case of the right to work – the 
focus is on flexicurity, namely on a Community action based on the orientations  of the 
Council pursuant to art. 128 TEC. 
 
The OMC, therefore, being legally weak by inclination if not by definition 
because it is not supported by a significant system of sanctions, can only temporarily be 
strong from a political point of view, thanks to the strength deriving from the contingent 
times, from temporary balances, while waiting for structurally solid solutions. This is 
particularly true in the recessionary economic stage persisting in many countries of the 
Union and whose nature and possible future developments appear to be unknown: 
cyclic crisis or renovation and transformation of markets? A crisis that States tend to 
face (or to be forced to face, urged by the disarticulation of party systems and by the 
risk of populist detours) within their own boundaries, because the price that 
governments must pay when they plan to support common strategies at an European 
level is extremely high (for that matter, also the currently strongest States, which now 
call for the highest strictness of their counterparts, could temporarily in the past set 
aside the monetary constraints established in Maastricht. 
 
The issue of the judicial creation of European law thus remains in existence. 
 
With respect to this issue, the criticism against the function of the Court of 
Justice, on the assumption that the Court establishes and balances values and principles 
by substituting for a democratic political body, appears to be misleading: this is a very 
ideological point of view, and because of that it does not consider the concrete features 
of the ongoing constitutional process: it is inspired by a “sovereignist” conception 
whereby solidarity among citizens of a constitutional State would be possible only “in 
the traditional form of people’s cohesion as cemented in the national conscience”40. 
 
Actually, in this unforeseen constituent process the Court of Justice has assumed 
the features of a body of constitutional jurisdiction: it tends to create the supreme 
judicial parameter by extracting it from constitutional traditions, it implements 
balancing techniques, it redefines processes (see for instance the cases of restriction of 
                                                 
40
 This was the critical summary of the “pseudo-sovereign” view by J. HABERMAS, Soltanto un sogno può 
salvare l’Europa, in La Repubblica, 9 giugno 2005[translation mine]: that was the difficult decade of the 
“stagnation” of the European constituent process, following the failed attempt to create the 
“Constitutional Treaty”; the decade which preceded the current awful period of “constitutional recession” 
(and of economic recession).  
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the decisional scope of the referring judge, as in the Wiking case); it determines in sum 
its own position in the system. 
 
The vicissitudes of social rights are a clear demonstration; however, they also 
prove the impossibility to accept “minimalist” views, which tend to minimize the 
importance of a constitutional “writing” (and thus to deem as negligible the elimination 
in the Treaty of Lisbon of the “symbols of constitutionality”). Such views are openly 
inspired by ordinary practical wisdom: it is believed that the Court of Justice will 
continue in any case its work of judicial shaping of rights, free from interferences of 
allegedly “constitutional” texts, with their flawed content and uncertain drafting. These 
views constitute the most intense leap of faith in the Treaty form and the highest distrust 
in the constituent process: where there is a Treaty, there must not be a written 
Constitution, which would be detrimental because the Treaty-supranational judge 
combination is sufficient to control the excessive role of States and to guarantee rights 
and freedoms. 
 
The “scandalous” social rights shine a light on the illusory character of these 
constructions. 
 
With written constitutional principles, the Court of Justice – in due time – would 
be forced to retreat before boundaries, would be crushed by the indeterminacies of the 
constituent process and would find itself in the fire of a conflict among national 
positions. 
 
In the field of social rights, in fact, it is time to make fundamental choices on the 
content of the European Constitution, because the balancing techniques in the normative 
system as defined by the reconstruction of common traditions and by Treaties are 
inadequate in front of the great ongoing changes. 
 
This is occurring starting from the “third globalization” – the current one – 
characterized by previously unknown asymmetries and externalities, in a context of 
abysmal inequalities (the new “failures of the market”). Before them, it will be difficult 
for Europe as a whole to remain within its boundaries. The crucial topic of this time, 
indeed, concerns migration; and in the field of rights – including social rights – it 
concerns universalization. The matter of the porous character of boundaries overlaps 
with the matter of its outward shift: with the enlargement towards Eastern countries, 
Europe is facing a new source of complexity, which forces it to internal diversification. 
Therefore, the issues are the following: what are the limits to diversification, and 
according to which justiciable constitutional parameter? Is this parameter to be found in 
common constitutional traditions? 
 
As outlined above, the principle of indivisibility was considered as a 
“spectacular” innovation when, through its incorporation in the Charter of Nice, it was 
thought to be introduced in the Constitutional Treaty, because social rights were 
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believed to find an appropriate protection even outside of national boundaries, moving 
beyond the assumed distance in Europe between the degree of protection recognized to 
them and the guarantee of economic freedoms. 
 
However, if we concretely observe individual national systems, we must 
consider the privatization processes in the field of essential public services, traditionally 
managed by public companies or by companies with significant public participation, 
under the assumption of a potential influence of business decisions on fundamental 
rights. Today States, which no longer manage them directly, intervene in these sectors 
in a regulatory way, creating rules of different hierarchy levels and considering the 
protection of the very negative freedoms (and precisely by doing so they define new 
limitations, because these freedoms imply the possibility of a direct activation of 
guarantees, without the need for normative policies). As far as social rights are 
concerned, these processes are potentially able to weaken their protection, because the 
State loses the status of provider of those services, necessarily becoming the regulator 
of private management. Therefore, it can no longer directly guarantee protection 
standards, and it can only indirectly pursue their conservation or expansion (in more and 
more difficult conditions: the general tendency is towards restriction): incentive 
policies, transfer of resources towards weak sectors. And thus the guarantee of social 
rights becomes indirect beyond what is necessary pursuant to their nature. 
 
Therefore, in a multi-level framework, the protective function of the boundary 
re-emerges in constitutional case-law, shielded by national sovereignty.  
 
From the point of view of European Union law, an expression of this 
phenomenon is the Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment on the Lisbon Treaty of 30 June 
2009.  
 
In Italy, when it was necessary to define the relationship between the law 
deriving from the European Convention of Human Rights and the national law, since 
the European Court decisions, undermining the results of the balance between the right 
to property and the social right to work, maintained the “inviolable” character of the 
former, the Italian Constitutional Court applied the “interposing parameter” model: 
ECHR rules derive from the provisions of the Convention as they are interpreted by the 
Strasbourg Court, and as such they cannot be called into question; however, since the 
foundation of their creation in the national system lies in art. 117, paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution, those provisions are substantiated in constitutional judgments concerning 
ordinary national laws. By doing so, the unmediated intrusion in the national system of 
supranational law, resulting from the interpretation of the Strasbourg Court, has been 
prevented, averting the direct disapplication by ordinary judges of laws believed to be 
unconstitutional. This is how the resurgence of the protective function of national 
sovereignty, as it appears in the political area of legislative production, occurred, and 
this is how a national constitutional judge has re-established its exclusive function of 
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control, restating that it is not “identifiable, with specific reference to conventional rules 
... any limitation of national sovereignty” (see judgments of 22 October 2007, n. 348 
and n. 349; 16 November 2009, n. 311; 30 November 2009, n. 317; 7 June 2011, n. 
181); thus, no concessions to a stronger position of the Strasbourg Court. 
 
 
VI. END OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TRIUMPH OF UNIVERSAL DEMOCRACY?  
 
The path and the destiny of national sovereignty – in the name of which the great 
tragedies of European and world history have unfolded, but which, in the developments 
of modern time, has also characterized the progressive establishment of the guarantee of 
fundamental rights on the grounds of Constitutions of the post-World War II era – are 
now open to new and previously unseen developments. 
 
Sovereignty, subjected to an advanced process of erosion, has not disappeared. 
Nor is it possible to believe that it is destined to do so, at a time when the perspective of 
new orders, of a new paradigm of the concept of State, of new variations of the issue of 
equality, is still unclear. 
 
The history of social rights in Europe epitomizes the complexity of this turn. 
State sovereignty is still perceived as a guarantee of protection systems: for this reason 
it disappears and it re-emerges among the stormy waves of the European constituent 
process. It re-emerges supported by populism and by regressive tendencies, especially 
in some less consolidated democracies.  
 
A harsh confrontation among general conceptions of economy, and among 
development models, is occurring: a continuation of wars (luckily) through other means, 
one could say. 
 
The condition for avoiding that the extinction, or the radical transformation, of 
State sovereignty result into the cancellation of the democratic principle rests in the 
creation of an European Constitution, grounded on the guarantee of civil and social 
rights; in economic policies not oriented according to regional closures; in a political 
government of Europe.  
 
It is not at all certain that this will be achieved, because history, just like 
markets, is not determined by an invisible and inescapable hand. But this is one of the 
possible solutions that the current crisis is offering. 
